Introduction
The Chinese party-state's switch to market incentives and competition-based compensation--while contributing mightily to the nation's modernity--has at the same time been at the very root of China's new urban poverty. Official concession that this is the case has sometimes been articulated quite openly, as in this statement:
-Following the prosperous development of the socialist market economy, urban residents' rice bowl is no longer iron; adding on other unforeseen events, some staff and workers' basic livelihood has met with difficulty.‖
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The main point here is that the incidence of urban indigence shot sharply upward once state and collective enterprises were enjoined to cut back drastically on their workforces after the mid-1990s. At the same time, with the total overhaul of the socialist economy and its institutions, traditional welfare entitlements were also taken away, 2 leaving losers at a total loss.
In the 1990s, the Chinese leadership became cognizant of and deeply concerned over these negative social externalities of marketization. Most especially, its members agonized over the potential political impact of these deprivations on its hallowed objectives of social stability and a successful project of state enterprise reform.
For securing these aims was deemed essential to the grander goal that has undergirded every undertaking of the post-Mao state: this is the modernity of the nation, particularly of its metropolises. Accordingly, the political elite initiated a novel welfare approach to handle the people most severely affected by economic restructuring--and therefore those most antithetical to the objective of smoothly sailing progress. These targeted persons constitute a category comprised of a never-before so sizable segment of the city populace: they were newly-minted, state-policy-provoked, The approach adopted appears to be an excellent way to ensure this result as it tends to detain most of the recipients within their domiciles, due both to their bodily weakness and to their sense of shame. They are the anti-emblem of China's urban modernization.
In what follows, I examine the expressed aims of the policy; quantify the amounts of funds laid out over time; and outline the procedures for establishing eligibility and disbursing allocations, plus document attendant mishaps, misunderstandings, and misappropriations that attend the implementation of the program. My sources include 53 recipient families interviewed in Wuhan in summer
2007
. 11 The residents in the communities covered could be questioned because of personal connections with community officials. Thus, the -sample‖ consists simply of those dibaohu members found at home who were willing to speak with us. I also spoke with bureaucrats in charge of the program in Wuhan and Lanzhou, and with community 9 Not only were such individuals likely to lose their jobs in the massive shakedown of the late 1990's and early 2000's, but, lacking skills, they could rarely hope to find new work (Tang Jun, "Selections," Chapter Three). "Zhongguo chengshi" reports on an investigation that found that among adult targets, those with primary education and below represented 24.1 percent, while 46.5 percent had been to junior high school, together amounting to 70.6 percent without any senior high school training. A mere 27.6 percent of these people boasted of having some sort of professional or handicraft skill, while just 2.9 percent claimed to have some work. As for their health, the Ministry of Civil Affairs announced that in a national study of 10,000 dibao households, 33.7 percent have disabled people, and 64.9 percent had one or more members with a chronic or serious illness. 10 The mindset and rationale informing the project evokes the reasoning of Borge Bakken, 
Stated Goals
The rhetoric of the program--especially its language of rights and self-reliance--belie its actual outcomes. achieved not by satisfying but by subduing them.
The Mechanics and Money Constituting the Program
Operationalizing the poverty line
The Regulations formalizing the system called for setting the outlays locally, in accord with the costs of the amount of food, clothing, and housing needed for minimal subsistence in a particular city. Designers of the program put urban authorities in charge of determining the line since prices, the pattern of consumption and the average income per capita vary geographically. Another reason was that it cities were originally to fund at least a portion of the outlay, so a given municipality's financial capability is critically relevant as well. 22 The cut-off line, set separately by and for each metropolis (and its own suburban areas), aims to subsidize households whose average per capita income falls below the amount necessary for purchasing basic necessities at the prices , 10 (1996) , 34 explains that the concrete method for setting the line.
prevailing locally. The line was to be set below both the minimum wage and unemployment insurance benefits, supposedly to encourage beneficiaries to accept employment whenever possible. But this element had a draconian correlate: a recipient's acquisition of even a tiny increment in income through occasional labor could result in drastic reduction in his/her household's dibao disbursement, so some (in my sample, one of 53) did feel disinclined to seek employment.
The bureaus of civil affairs, labor, finance, auditing, personnel, statistics and prices, along with the local branches of the trade union, jointly stipulate and, when deemed necessary (as in times of inflation, when a city's financial receipts have had a good turn or when the standard of living among the general population of a city has risen) 23 , hiking up the local cut-off line. 24 Other departments were given other, related functions, e.g., the education bureau had ensure sure that the targets' childrens' miscellaneous school fees were either reduced or cancelled, and medical departments were to do the same for medical treatment fees. 25 In addition, most places created a special leadership small group, located within the bureau of civil affairs, to take overall control.
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All told, the financial situation of the city has a determining impact upon where the poverty line is set; poorer urban jurisdictions from the start preferred to set the standard lower, so as to minimize the numbers for which they would be responsible, whereas in cities with more revenue and where, often, the numbers of the povertystricken are fewer, the line is pegged at a higher level. Though initially it was projected that the costs would be shared relatively equally between the central government and the localities, in practice the portion born by localities has varied significantly, from sites where the city pays the bulk or even all of the allowances (as in the wealthy coastal region) to places where sizable assistance from the central government means that a locale bears almost none of the expenses (in the west).
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The authorizing regulations divide the recipients into two types: those who fit the conditions of the old -three withouts,‖ 28 and those with some minimal income. 51 To get a better sense of how the program operates on the ground, it is necessary to examine the official procedures and the pitfalls often entailed in pursuing them.
Procedures and their Pitfalls

Procedures
The workaday execution of the program plainly doles out disgrace to its targets.
Its urban management splits discretion among four levels: the city, the district, the street, and the -community‖ [shequ] (a unit which replaced and absorbed several residence committees each in the early 2000's). All these jurisdictions share in reporting, registering, investigating, approving, issuing forms, making modifications, and filing cases. 52 The province also has a role: along with the city and the county it formulates local policy, dispenses propaganda, and organizes supervisory work. County and district civil affairs departments take charge of implementing the system within their areas, look into and approve applications, and issue certificates; the street offices handle registration, while serving as a lower-level examiner of cases; and the residents' committee (the community), which--situated among the families' homes, and staffed by individuals closely familiar with the target population--takes in the cases and performs the initial check-up and all subsequent reporting. Subsequent, regular inspections (sometimes as frequent as every three months, in other cases just every six 56 ) are meant to certify that the family remains qualified to enjoy the subsidy. When its situation or income undergoes alterations (through a retirement, a death in the family, a new odd job, or health changes), the household head is to notify the relevant office in its community to arrange for stopping, reducing or increasing its outlays.
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There are conspicuous variations in the approaches taken by different municipalities in administering the dibao. In a 1998-99 investigation of implementation in five cities, Tang Jun and his research group found that Lanzhou was employing a more mobilizational approach to its indigent than was Wuhan. Officials in Lanzhou -emphasized arousing the dibao targets' activism for production, encouraging and organizing them to develop self-reliance.‖ 58 Walking through Wuhan's streets after 2000
I discovered that nowhere in the city could shoe repair specialists be found operating outside, apparently banned by the authorities. And as of 2007 these cities plainly displayed a persistent divergence in administrative methods, with Lanzhou clearly offering its indigent more leniency for their sidewalk business than was Wuhan. That year I encountered a talented but hard-up woman in Wuhan who complained that the fees for exhibiting her artwork on the streets had escalated substantially over time, until she was forced to abandon any effort to try to make sales.
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But in Lanzhou, all manner of curbside business was going on unobstructed, including stalls for fixing footwear as well as bunches of young men hawking political picture posters. 60 In line with these observed differences, the section chief of the dibao The other sort of unintended outcome is one that evidently occurs sufficiently frequently as to be inveighed against in official documents and in informal conversation with program managers. This is an effect that arises as implementation leaves open channels for embezzlement, deception and defrauding, usually on the part of the officials in charge, but also sometimes--how often is impossible to document--on the part of the program's participants. These behaviors achieve marginalization by subversion of state design. But whether by means of dictates or by their debasement, both categories of activity achieve disentitlement.
61 Interview, September 5, 2007, Lanzhou.
Exclusions: marginalization via state design
The primary strategy cities use to bar seemingly deserving beneficiaries from the program--one mode of keeping them marginal (though perhaps not consciously so calculated)--is to disallow the dibao for households whose behavior might help them ascend out of poverty. Ji'nan, for instance, ruled in August 2007 that anyone who had purchased a computer or who often uses a cell phone could not enjoy the dibao.
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Beijing's regulations preclude persons who had bought cell phones, had arranged for their children to attend schools of their own choice or private schools, or were keeping any domestic pets. In Liaoning, using a household phone more than 15 percent more than the local dibao norm or even having received gifts whose value was above the poverty line disqualified potential partakers. In Hainan, having births outside the plan can leave out an otherwise needy household. 63 Some places banned people from becoming recipients if they had a family business, regardless of its profits or losseseven owning a firm losing money and incapable of supporting the family's livelihood could spark quarrels between civil affairs departments and an applicant.
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In Wuhan, the following circumstances could deprive the destitute of succor:
having a motorized vehicle (unless it was required because of disability); having electrical fees surpassing 15 yuan per month, except in the high-heat months of July, August and September, or phone fees beyond 40 yuan per month; using a cell phone or other hand-held communication device (even if having obtained it as a gift or a loan!);
going on the web on a home computer; or -without reason raising hell and influencing public affairs, maltreating and threatening work personnel.‖ Obviously, the final restriction can be loosely interpreted, so that anyone challenging a decision of the dibao administrators--even anyone who does meet the specifications--could be thrown off the rolls.
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Also forbidden was arranging for a child to enrol in special classes for study or training; doing odd jobs for which the wages are hard to verify; or for a child to be Some urban administrators first determine the amount of funds they are willing to assign to the program and then set the number of dibaohu accordingly. The most common contrary practice is to eliminate people with the ability to work who have not found employment by considering that they have received the wages they would have earned had they been on a job. Such reckoning -regards as income‖ salary or benefits that, properly speaking, ought to have been--but were not--paid to a person, using their city's minimum wage or unemployment insurance subsidy to assess the amount of the supposedly received income or benefit, and then treating that sum as if it were the person's actual income. 68 Another variant is to count as part of a person's income the funds that his/her legal supporter ought to be giving him or her, even if s/he never really gets it. Still, several interviewees in Wuhan found their families' dibao funds cut back or cut off when a member did take on some wage-earning work. In one case a wife's street-sweeping led to deductions that left four people to survive on some 500-plus yuan per month. 70 In another, the wife in a family of three bravely reflected that:
We can still go on, use the dibao money to raise our son (then age 12)--each month we get a subsidy of 234 yuan. Though it's not much, some is always better than nothing.
The family has one person working, so the subsidy was lowered a lot. We're not thinking of arguing about it, we all are very submissive people, so we don't think of bickering over And one study found that on average families actually obtain 36.5 yuan less than is reported to upper levels to have been distributed. 78 These stratagems keep the deck stacked against the deserving.
There are instances of dishonesty among the targets, too. According to journal articles, some dibaohu falsely report their income, forge documentary evidence, or otherwise conceal their earnings or assets. This is surely true in some instances. But it was striking how close the per capita income was that many Wuhan respondents revealed to us. These so similar self-reports would seem to suggest that those informants willing to disclose their monthly intake were telling us the truth. and even if they have an adequate source of income. 79 One Wuhan community leader inveighed against residents in ill health whose necessary outlays go beyond their means, but who fail to comprehend that the dibao is based on income, not on a household's mandatory expenditures, and thus is not geared to help people meet all their costs.
Alluding to -dingzihu,‖ or troublemakers, she complained of -residents who create unusual difficulties,‖ such as those who -clearly don't fit the criteria for getting the dibao but still press for it,‖ often -run[ing] about shouting verbal threats.‖ 80 It would seem that the city might find the funds to absorb such malcontents into the fold, thereby rendering their existence less terribly bitter.
Conclusion
The dibao program was admittedly put into place to do nothing more than meet the most minimal requirements of the targeted needy. Its recipients were to be kept alive but muted, in the interest of rendering China modern without their interference, whether that interference might transpire out on the roadways as they eke out an unsightly sustenance or whether they otherwise venture outside to rail. Above all, they
were not to disturb the forward march of the nation onward toward progress, which their uncultured and unwell persons seemed prone to sully.
Perhaps without actively and specifically meaning to mold their situation in this way, the state has dealt with these dibaohu in a manner that maintains them and their children either sickly and therefore off the streets or else insufficiently schooled to advance in society, out of work and eating too little to grow strong. And those able to improve their prospects by providing extra education for their children or by using computers, or to brighten their existence by communicating on cell phones or by seeking entertainment, become for these reasons ineligible. No leader of the country would be apt to acknowledge the playing out of this subtext. But I have demonstrated that both the regulations that shape this program and the regimens used in enforcing it--whether by design or by subterfuge--marginalize the most indigent among the urbanites. As they do so, they succeed in forging what for China is an unaccustomed -if mostly invisible--underclass, plus purely pristine, and seemingly totally unsullied, modern, -civilized‖ cities.
79 Gong, Guozheng, "Dibao" zhong de jizhong cuowu renshi" [Several kinds of mistaken understandings in the dibao] ZGMZ 4 (2000). 80 Interview, Community V.
